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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
The amici are professors who teach and research
American employment discrimination law. They have
a professional interest in ensuring 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
which provides a cause of action for discrimination in
the making and enforcing of contracts, including employment contracts, is interpreted in a manner consistent with its text, purpose, and history. The amici
are: Sandra Sperino, University of Cincinnati College
of Law; Anthony Michael Kreis, Chicago-Kent College
of Law; Sachin Pandya, University of Connecticut
School of Law; Deborah Widiss, Indiana University
Maurer School of Law; Charlotte Alexander, J. Mack
Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University; Rachel Arnow-Richman, University of Denver
Sturm College of Law; Rick Bales, ONU College of Law;
Robert Bird, University of Connecticut School of Business; Elizabeth Brown, Bentley University; Martha
Chamallas, The Ohio State University Moritz College
of Law; David Cohen, Drexel University Thomas R.
Kline School of Law; Jennifer Drobac, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law; Leora Eisenstadt, Temple University, Fox School of Business;
Melissa Essary, Campbell Law School; Richard
Frankel, Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of
Law; Michael Green, Texas A&M University School of
Law; Tristin Green, University of San Francisco School
of Law; D. Wendy Greene, Drexel University Thomas
1

The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No
counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and
no such counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended
to fund the preparation or submission of the brief.
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R. Kline School of Law; Joanna Grossman, SMU Dedman School of Law; Jack Harrison, Salmon P. Chase
College of Law, Northern Kentucky University; L. Camille Hébert, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law; Ann Hubbard, University of Cincinnati
College of Law; Shirley Lin, NYU School of Law; Lucas
Loafman, College of Business Administration, Texas
A&M University, Central Texas; Alex Long, University
of Tennessee College of Law; Jean Love, Santa Clara
University School of Law; S. Elizabeth Malloy, University of Cincinnati College of Law; Marcia McCormick,
St. Louis University School of Law; Ann McGinley, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas; Nicole Buonocore Porter, University of Toledo
College of Law; Jamie Darin Prenkert, Kelley School
of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington; Stephen Rich, USC Gould School of Law; Paul Secunda,
Marquette University Law School; Suja Thomas, University of Illinois College of Law; Lesley Wexler, University of Illinois College of Law; and Noah Zatz,
UCLA School of Law. Institutional affiliations are for
identification purposes only.
------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should not interpret section 1981 to
require proof of but-for causation, given that statute’s text, history, and purpose. Although Comcast
invokes the canon of statutory construction that Congress intends statutory terms to have their settled
common-law meaning, that canon does not apply here.
Section 1981 has no statutory text that reflects a

3
common-law understanding of causation. Indeed, in
1866, when Congress enacted the predecessor to section 1981, there was no well-settled common law of tort
at all. Rather, just as courts have read 42 U.S.C. § 1982,
which shares common text, history and purpose, this
Court should read section 1981 to require plaintiffs alleging race discrimination to prove that Comcast was
motivated at least in part by race.
Moreover, even if Congress had intended section
1981 to incorporate tort law’s evolving understanding
of factual causation, that common-law doctrine includes not only but-for cause, but a bundle of causal
standards that are appropriate in different cases.
Thus, to approximate the common law, this Court could
choose two options: (1) apply but-for cause along with
all of its supporting causal doctrines, including those
which apply in cases with multiple, sufficient causes of
an injury, or (2) apply a motivating factor standard, an
approach that mitigates the limitations of but-for
cause through a single standard.
Even if this Court were to interpret section 1981
to require showing only but-for cause, it should make
clear that but-for cause is not “sole” cause. That is, in
this context, but-for cause simply requires a plaintiff
to prove that race is one of the causes for an injury,
even if there were also other causes. Accordingly, in
most cases, it is not appropriate to dismiss section 1981
claims at the pleading stage on causation grounds.
------------------------------------------------------------------
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ARGUMENT
I.

Section 1981’s Text and Purpose Indicate
that Congress Did Not Intend to Require
Proof of But-for Causation

Section 1981 affords “[a]ll persons” the “same right
. . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by
white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Section 1981 provides a cause of action against race discrimination in
employment that remains “separate, distinct, and independent” from Title VII, Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975), and other federal
laws that prohibit employment discrimination. Congress itself has stressed section 1981’s nature as an independent federal cause of action. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b)(4) (cautioning against reading a Title VII
amendment to “limit the scope of . . . section 1981 of
this title”).
Comcast, however, argues that this Court should
adopt “textbook tort law” on factual cause and require
the plaintiffs-respondents to prove that race was the
but-for cause of Comcast’s refusal to contract with
them. This argument rests on two flawed ideas. First,
Comcast assumes that it is appropriate to apply the
common law to section 1981’s primary, operative provision. Second, it assumes that if the Court were to apply common law, the common law requires the plaintiff
to prove but-for cause. Neither proposition is correct.
Comcast’s argument contravenes this Court’s warning
to not “adopt a causal standard so strict that it would
undermine congressional intent where neither the
plain text of the statute nor legal tradition demands
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such an approach.” Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S.
434, 458 (2014).
First, unlike the statutory term “because” in the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(1) (“because of ”), and Title VII’s retaliation
provision, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (“because”), which
this Court reads to require proof of but-for causation,
see University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v.
Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013); Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009), Congress did not
use the word “because” or another similar term in the
text of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to denote the requisite connection between a defendant’s alleged conduct and injury
suffered.2
Rather, section 1981 provides that “all persons”
shall “have the same right” to make contracts “as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Non-white
persons enjoy “the same right” as white citizens only if
race plays no motivating role in any impairment of the
rights that section 1981 protects, including the right to
make contracts. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 426 (1968) (section 1 of Civil Rights Act of
1866 “was meant to prohibit all racially motivated deprivations of the rights enumerated in the statute”).
Second, Comcast’s view directly conflicts with the
long-standing practice of reading section 1981 and
1982 similarly, due to their common language, origins,
2

For discussion of the difficulties of applying tort common
law to statutes, see generally Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label,
66 FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2014).
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and purposes. See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553
U.S. 442, 447-48 (2008). Congress originally wrote sections 1981 and 1982 together in the same section of the
same Act, see Act of April 9, 1866, c. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27,
re-enacted by Act of May 31, 1870, c. 114, § 18, 16 Stat.
140, 144; see Jones, 392 U.S. at 436 (1870 re-enactment
did not alter 1866 act’s scope). Thus, section 1982 uses
similar language, declaring that all citizens “have the
same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens” with respect to property. 42 U.S.C. § 1982. “Indeed, § 1982 differs from § 1981 only in that it refers, not to the ‘right
. . . to make and enforce contracts,’ 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a),
but to the ‘right . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property,’ § 1982.”
CBOCS West, 553 U.S. at 448. Moreover, “[l]ike § 1981,
§ 1982 represents an immediately post-Civil War legislative effort to guarantee the then newly freed slaves
the same legal rights that other citizens enjoy.” Id.; accord Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160 (1976).
This matters here, because, based on section
1982’s text, history, and purpose, courts have ruled
that plaintiffs bringing section 1982 claims need only
show that a defendant was motivated in part by race,
even if other causes existed. Payne v. Bracher, 582 F.2d
17, 18 (5th Cir. 1978); Green v. Century 21, 740 F.2d
460, 464 (6th Cir. 1984); Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667
F.2d 1198, 1202 (5th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Sol D. Adler
Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1970); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir.
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1974); Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 383 (10th
Cir. 1973); Miller v. Poretsky, 595 F.2d 780, 788 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
Third, when Congress originally enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, torts was not yet a fully-developed
area of common law, but an ill-defined residual category for diverse civil actions not arising out of contract.
The first American torts treatise was published only
seven years earlier. See Francis Hilliard, The Law of
Torts or Private Wrongs (1859).3 Torts was not taught
as a separate law school course until a Boston practitioner taught it at Harvard in 1870 by abridging an
English torts treatise. See G. Edward White, The Emergence and Doctrinal Development of Tort Law, 18701930, 11 U. ST. THOMAS L. REV. 463, 467-68 (2014).
Calling that abridged edition a “cheap little book” for
the practicing lawyer, Oliver W. Holmes Jr. lamented
that, as it then existed, “Torts is not a proper subject
for a law book,” and longed for a not-yet-written treatise that dealt with the subject “philosophically.” Book
Notices, 5 AM. L. REV. 340-41 (1871); see White, 11 U.
ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 468-69 & n.10. Only in 1873 did
Holmes first introduce his influential views on general
tort-law principles. See Oliver W. Holmes Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652 (1873); see also Oliver
Wendell Holmes, THE COMMON LAW 53-110 (Little,
Brown & Co. 1881). And the first Restatement on torts
was not published until over half a century later. See 1
3

For later editions, see Francis Hilliard, The Law of Torts or
Private Wrongs (2d ed. 1861); and Francis Hilliard, The Law of
Torts or Private Wrongs (3d ed. 1866).
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Restatement (First) of Torts § 9 (1934) (defining “legal
cause”); id. §§ 279-280 (using substantial factor causation for intentional wrongs). Thus, this Court should
not act as if Congress was legislating against a welldeveloped and understood body of tort law generally or
a body of causation doctrine specifically. See G. Edward
White, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 14 (expanded ed. 2003) (“Nor was a comprehensive standard of liability for ‘tort’ actions present in
any developed form prior to the 1870s.”).
Fourth, requiring but-for cause in section 1981
cases would contravene a key purpose of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866: to secure by federal statute the
equality of all persons with respect to certain enumerated rights, including that “[o]ne race shall not be more
favored in this respect than another.” Cong. Globe 1117
(Rep. Wilson); see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 292, 296 (1976) (explaining
Thirty-ninth Congress intended to “establish[ ] in the
federal law a broader principle than would have been
necessary simply to meet the particular and immediate plight of the newly freed Negro slaves”). The Civil
Rights Act of 1866’s mandate is unequivocal: nonwhite persons are guaranteed absolute “equality with
the white man in all affairs of life,” and its language is
therefore “comprehensive” to secure equal citizenship
by “includ[ing] within its broad terms every right arising in the affairs of life.” Coger v. Nw. Union Packet Co.,
37 Iowa 145, 156 (1873).
Given this aim, it seems unlikely that Congress
would have wanted courts to borrow from the common
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law so as to make it harder to prove section 1981 liability. To the contrary, this Court has long “implied a
damages remedy to effectuate the declaration of rights
contained in” section 1 of the 1866 Act, Jett v. Dallas
Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701, 731 (1989),
despite no express remedy in the statutory text. And
this Court has read section 1981 to authorize a retaliation cause of action—though not expressly in the text
itself and not a background common-law tort principle—in part “for reasons related to the enforcement of
the express statutory right.” CBOCS West, 553 U.S. at
452. Thus, it makes little sense that this Court would
now import a causation standard that would make it
harder to enforce the rights that section 1981 protects,
given the statute’s history and purpose.
Fifth, the expressio unius canon, see Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 381 (2013), counsels
against applying but-for causation to section 1981 liability. The Thirty-ninth Congress knew how to expressly refer to common law, because, in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, it did just that. At the same time it
wrote what is now section 1981(a), see § 1, 14 Stat. 27,
Congress also provided, in section 3 of that Act, “federal jurisdiction to hear, among other things, civil actions brought to enforce § 1” of the Act, Moor v.
Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693, 705 (1973), and further
provided that in “all cases” where federal laws are unsuited or
deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies . . . , the common law,
as modified and changed by the constitution
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and statutes of the State wherein the court
having jurisdiction of the cause, civil or criminal, is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States, shall be extended to and govern said courts in the trial and disposition of
such cause. . . .
§ 3, 14 Stat. 27, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(a) (emphasis added). In this way, the Thirtyninth Congress let federal courts borrow to some limited extent from state common law to “furnish suitable
remedies” in civil cases so long as “federal law is unsuited or insufficient,” thus “complement[ing] the various acts which do create federal causes of action for the
violation of federal civil rights,” Moor, 411 U.S. at 702
& n.14, 703 (citing, inter alia, §§ 1981, 1982).
Congress, however, did not expressly refer to common law when declaring, in section 1 of the same Act,
its protection for all persons to enjoy the “same” enumerated rights “as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a). That Congress could have but did not
do so implies that Congress did not intend courts to be
tied to common law principles when deciding when section 1981 had been violated. That inference is stronger
still, given how Congress had already referred expressly to “common law” in various federal statutes.4

4

See, e.g., Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 179, § 4, 12 Stat. 72, 73
(extending “common law” to execute treaty obligations where federal law is unsuited or deficient in providing remedies); Act of
June 19, 1860, ch. 158, § 8 (providing, for divorces in District of
Columbia, that “legitimacy of issue” of persons divorced for a
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Accordingly, the expressio unius canon counsels
against relying on common law to restrict the scope of
section 1981 liability.
II.

Textbook Tort Doctrine on Factual Causation Includes More Than Just But-for Cause.

Even if the Thirty-ninth Congress intended section 1981 to incorporate by reference common-law tort
doctrine’s evolving understandings of causation, that
doctrine is more than just the but-for cause test. Instead, that doctrine consists of a bundle of causal
standards and accompanying rules for when to apply
them. These other causal standards cover cases (1)
where an injury has multiple, sufficient causes; or (2)
that justify shifting or changing the burden of proof on
factual causation.
Accordingly, if Congress intended section 1981 to
borrow from textbook tort common law, this Court
must assume that Congress intended to incorporate all
that doctrine, not just one piece of it. As this Court has
explained:
[T]he availability of alternative causal standards where circumstances warrant is, no less
than the but-for test itself as a default, part of
the background legal tradition against which
Congress has legislated.

cause not specifically authorized “shall be tried and determined,
according to the course of the common law”).
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Paroline, 572 U.S. at 458 (internal citation omitted). If
a court wants to apply textbook tort law, it has two
choices, both of which try to ameliorate the widely
known problems with but-for cause. It can use but-for
cause, along with a host of other supporting causation
doctrines, such as consideration of multiple, sufficient
causes or shifting burdens of proof where appropriate.
Or, it can choose the motivating factor standard, along
with appropriate remedial principles. Importantly,
adopting but-for cause alone does not mimic the common law.
First, tort law recognizes that a but-for test should
not apply in multiple, sufficient cause cases, i.e., where
there are at least two concurrent yet independent
causes of an injury (one of which is the defendant’s
wrongful conduct) and each cause, if occurring alone,
would still have led to the injury. Cf. Burrage v. United
States, 571 U.S. 204, 214-15 (2014) (refusing to “accept
or reject” whether the statutory phrase “resulting
from” in federal drug statute applies in cases of multiple, sufficient causes).
To illustrate the problem, suppose Person A negligently starts a fire that races toward a house. A lightning strike then starts a second fire on the other side
of the house; both fires reach the house at the same
time, burning it down. In such a case, Person A’s negligent conduct is not the but-for cause of the damage to
the house. Had Person A not started the fire, the house
would have burned down anyway. See Dan B. Dobbs et
al., THE LAW OF TORTS § 189 (2d ed. 2019) (citing
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Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie
Ry., 146 Minn. 430 (1920)).
Accordingly, the drafters of the Restatement of
Torts recognized that the plaintiff should not be required to prove but-for cause when multiple, sufficient
causes exist, but instead just that the defendant’s conduct was a sufficient cause of the injury. Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional
Harm § 27 & Reporters’ Note (2010); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 432(2) (1965); see also Bostic v. GeorgiaPac. Corp., 439 S.W.3d 332, 344 (Tex. 2014) (discussing
causal frameworks); Dobbs, supra, at § 189 (“It would
be a windfall to the negligent defendants if they were
to escape liability for the harm merely because another
tortfeasor’s negligence was also sufficient to cause the
same harm.”). This Court also has recognized that
but-for cause is not appropriate in multiple, sufficient
cause cases. Paroline, 572 U.S. at 451; Nassar, 570 U.S.
at 347 (citing Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability
for Physical and Emotional Harm § 27, and cmt. b
(2010)).
Second, textbook tort doctrine recognizes that
courts may shift or change the burdens of proof on causation when multiple actors act wrongfully, only one
harms the plaintiff, and it is atypically or unduly difficult for the plaintiff to prove which of them harmed the
plaintiff. E.g., Restatement (Second), supra, at § 433B(3);
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm § 28(b); Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1,
3 (Cal. 1948); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d
924, 928 (Cal. 1980) (market share liability); see also
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Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 263 (1989)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (acknowledging tort law “has long recognized that in certain
‘civil cases’ leaving the burden of persuasion on the
plaintiff to prove ‘but-for’ causation would be both unfair and destructive of the deterrent purposes embodied in the concept of duty of care”).
For example, in Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal.
1948), two quail hunters—each armed with a twelvegauge shotgun—negligently shot toward the plaintiff
at about the same time. One shot struck plaintiff in the
upper lip. The other shot, which struck him in the right
eye, “was the major factor in assessing damages,” and
it could have only come from the gun of either one or
the other defendant, not both. Though both defendants
had breached a duty of care, if the plaintiff bore the
burden of proving which of the defendants caused his
eye injury, that burden would be too hard to meet, and
therefore plaintiff would not recover for his injuries.
Accordingly, the court shifted the burden of proving
causation to the defendants. See id. at 3-4.
Thus, one way to apply tort common law to a statute is to adopt but-for cause and all of the other causation doctrines that address its known deficiencies.
Together, these doctrines form the common law doctrine of causation.
Another option is to pair a motivating-factor
standard with a same-action damages defense so as to
vindicate a person’s section 1981 rights without overcompensating plaintiffs. For example, in Edwards v.
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Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 855 F.2d 1345 (8th Cir. 1988),
the court held that a plaintiff could establish section
1981 liability by showing that race was a “substantial
or motivating factor” in his or her discharge, id. at
1349, but that the defendant-employer could avoid reinstatement or back pay by showing that it would have
fired the plaintiff “even if race had not been a motivating factor.” Id. This defense “prevents an employee
from being placed in a better position as a result of his
race than he would otherwise occupy.” Id. Relying in
part on the common-law practice of awarding nominal
damages for deprivations of “absolute” rights that
should be “scrupulously observed” even if a plaintiff
cannot prove how such deprivation caused her any actual injury, id. at 1350 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 274, 266 (1978)), the court observed that “the right
to be free from intentional racial employment discrimination [under section 1981] is absolute in the same
sense,” id.
Indeed, several circuits had adopted the same
approach under Title VII, even before 1991, when Congress codified the rule by adding 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g).5 See also Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 294 P.3d
5

See, e.g., Fadhl v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 741 F.2d
1163, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 1984); Patterson v. Greenwood Sch. Dist.
50, 696 F.2d 293, 295 (4th Cir. 1982); Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d
1083, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1976); King v. Laborers Int’l Union of N.
Am., 443 F.2d 273, 278-79 (6th Cir. 1971). Congress added
§ 2000e-5(g) in response to a same-action defense to Title VII liability announced in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 22
(1989), see Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003), and thus
it has no relevance to the scope of section 1981 liability.
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49, 66-67 (Cal. 2013) (recognizing “substantial motivating factor” liability under State employment discrimination for discriminatory firing, but precluding
remedies of reinstatement, back pay, and noneconomic
damages if defendant proves same-action defense); cf.
Paroline, 572 U.S. at 458 (interpreting statute to require restitution in an amount that “comports with the
defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s general losses”).
Applying but-for cause as a stand-alone causation
doctrine does not mimic the common law. Instead, it
would require plaintiffs to prove more than the common law requires. Requiring the plaintiff to establish
but-for cause to prevail on a section 1981 claim would
also create the odd result that race discrimination
claims under section 1981 would have a more constrained causal standard than employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a). This would be particularly inappropriate
since section 1981 and its legislative twin, section
1982, were enacted to universally stamp out the vestiges of slavery and all racial barriers to equal public
citizenship for former slaves.
III. But-for Cause Can Exist Even if Factors
Other than Race Played a Role in the Decision.
Even if this Court reads only the but-for cause
standard into section 1981, that standard does not require proving that only race caused the outcome.
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Rather, a party can establish but-for cause even where
there are many other causal factors, i.e., so long as the
defendant’s conduct
combines with other factors to produce the result, so long as the other factors alone would
not have done so—if, so to speak, it was the
straw that broke the camel’s back. Thus, if poison is administered to a man debilitated by
multiple diseases, it is a but-for cause of his
death even if those diseases played a part in
his demise, so long as, without the incremental effect of the poison, he would have lived.
Burrage, 571 U.S. at 211. An act can be a necessary
condition of harm even when it is one of many acts that
were together necessary for the harm to occur. See
McDonald, 427 U.S. at 282 n.10, Restatement (Third),
supra, at § 26 cmt. b & c; see also Restatement (Second),
supra, at § 430, cmt. d.
To illustrate, if a child suffers a seizure after a vaccination, and that seizure would not have occurred absent both the vaccination and that child’s prior
traumatic injury, then the vaccination is still a but-for
cause of the seizure. See Restatement (Second), supra,
at § 430, cmt. c; see also id. § 433B, illus. 5. An act can
also be a cause of an outcome if it accelerates “an outcome that otherwise would have occurred at a later
time.” Restatement (Third), supra, at § 26 cmt. b.
To illustrate further, suppose that an employer
considers firing an employee for chronic tardiness, and
soon thereafter learns that the employee is pregnant.
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Then, the employer fires her. Even if the employer
would not have fired her for tardiness alone or pregnancy alone, but instead her pregnancy combined with
the tardiness to produce the firing, then her pregnancy
was a but-for cause of her termination. But for her
pregnancy, she would not have been terminated. Cf.
Jones v. Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 617 F.3d 1273, 1277
(10th Cir. 2010) (but-for causal standard, read by Gross
into ADEA, “does not require plaintiffs to show that
age was the sole motivating factor in the employment
decision”; employer liable under ADEA even “if other
factors contributed to its taking an adverse action, as
long as age was the factor that made a difference”) (internal citations omitted).
Unfortunately, some courts err by equating but-for
cause with sole cause,6 cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
241 & n.7 (explaining the difference). Other courts correctly state that but-for cause does not mean sole
cause, but then misapply but-for cause when multiple
people are involved in an adverse action or when both
legitimate and discriminatory reasons combine to produce an adverse outcome,7 see Leal v. McHugh, 731
6

See, e.g., Rattigan v. Holder, 982 F. Supp. 2d 69, 81 (D.D.C.
2013), aff ’d, 780 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Hendon v. Kamtek,
Inc., 117 F. Supp. 3d 1325, 1330 (N.D. Ala. 2015); Montgomery v.
Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama, No. 2:12-CV-2148-WMA,
2015 WL 1893471, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 2015).
7
E.g., Saunders v. McMahon, 300 F. Supp. 3d 211, 231
(D.D.C. 2018); Shumate v. Selma City Bd. of Educ., No. CIV. 1100078-CG-M, 2013 WL 5758699, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 24, 2013),
aff ’d, 581 F. App’x 740 (11th Cir. 2014); see also U.S. ex rel.
Schweizer v. Oce N. Am., 956 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2013) (in
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F.3d 405, 415 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing erroneous inference from “mixed motive” standard that a plaintiff
cannot prove but-for cause in all multiple cause cases).
In fact, “[n]o modification of the but-for standard is
necessary or appropriate to account for the multiple
causes in every causal set.” Restatement (Third), supra,
at § 26 cmt. i. Thus, if this Court reads but-for cause
into section 1981, it should at least take pains to make
clear to the lower courts that but-for cause does not
mean sole cause and that plaintiffs may prevail on a
but-for cause standard in many multiple cause cases.
Similarly, dismissals of section 1981 claims at the
pleading stage for failure to state a claim on causation
grounds should rarely be appropriate. FED.R.CIV.P.
12(b)(6). In most cases, the plaintiff ’s complaint will
plausibly plead but-for cause. Even in cases involving
multiple causes, the procedural posture of the case will
make it inappropriate for a judge to determine the relative role played by each causal factor. Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 & n.1 (2002) (court
“must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint”); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (same). Even if the
Court adopts but-for cause, dismissal of this case is not
appropriate.
------------------------------------------------------------------

False Claims Act case); Leora F. Eisenstadt, Causation in Context, 36 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 22 (2015).
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court should affirm the decision below.
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